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VIRGINIA'S UNTESTED STATUTE REQUIRING CON-
TRIBUTION TOWARD STATE CARE OF INSANE
Code of Virginia § 37-125.1 through 37-125.14, enacted as
Chapter 536, Acts of 1948, represents a legislative effort to shift
in part the burden of the support of adjudged incompetent persons
from the State to the individuals themselves or persons liable under
law for their support. The text of § 125.1 reads, "Any person who
has been or who may be committed or admitted to any hospital for
the insane or colony for the epileptics or the feeble-minded, and any
person admitted or committed for drug addiction or the intemperate
use of alcohol, or the estate of any such person, or the person legally
liable for the support of any such person, shall be liable for the
expenses of his care, treatment and maintenance in such institution.
Such expenses shall not exceed the actual per capita cost of main-
tenance, or the sum of forty dollars per month, whichever amount
is the lesser, and shall be fixed by the Department of Mental Hy-
giene and Hospitals."
Provisions follow for determination of the parties' ability to pay
and for steps to be taken in event of failure to pay. § 125.9 is the
important one of these: "Hearing and order; matters for considera-
tion-At such hearing the court shall hear the allegations and
proofs of the parties and shall by order require payment of main-
tenance or any part thereof by the parties legally liable therefor,
if of sufficient ability, having due regard for the financial condition
and estate of the patient or inmate, his present and future needs, and
the present and future needs of his lawful dependents, if such pro-
ceeding is to charge the patient or inmate with such expenses; and
if such proceeding is to charge any other person legally liable for
such expenses, the court shall have due regard for the financial
condition and estate of such person, his present and future needs,
and the present and future needs of his lawful dependents."
Next are provisions for modification, appeal and enforcement
of the order, after which § 125.13 states: "When collection of ex-
penses not required-This article shall not be held or construed to
require the Department to collect the expenses of the care, treat-
ment and maintenance of any indigent patient or inmate from such
person, or to collect such expenses from any person legally liable
therefor, where investigation discloses that such person legally
liable for the support is without financial means, or that such pay-
ment would work a hardship on such person or his family. Neither
shall it be the duty or obligation of the Department to institute any
proceedings provided for in this article to effect such collection
where investigation discloses that such proceedings would be with-
out effect, or would work a hardship on such patient or inmate, or
the person legally liable .for his support." The concluding section
deals with the liability of the patient's estate after death.
As no reported case challenging this law has, as yet, been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and because of its pro-
nounced social and economic implications, the statute seems to
deserve serious consideration on, at least, the following points:
I. The validity of the law itself; and if valid,
II. What persons may be affected by it; and,
III. What problems may arise from its application.
IV. Finally, certain conclusions may be drawn as to desiderata.
I. Formerly it was the policy of the State of Virginia to take
care of insane persons without expense to them or others;' this
was declaratory of the common law rule that there was no liability
2
nor duty 3 of the responsible person to support the insane one.
Statutory change or modification of the rule has occurred in
at least forty-five states; for example, in Delaware,4 Georgia,'
Florida,6 Iowa7 and Kansas8 the statutes set forth that the responsi-
ble person "shall pay." While Massachussetts, 9 Illinois,10 Mary-
land,11 Louisiana, 12 Alabama,13 Connecticut, 14 Idaho,15 and Ark-
ansas16 phrase their respective laws to provide that such party shall
"pay if able." Kentucky 17 and Indiana' s statutes provide that if the
1. Commonwealth v. Mason, 177 Va. 684, 15 S.E.2d 114 (1941); Brunn
v. Western State Hospital, 110 Va. 321, 66 S.E. 48 (1909).
2. In re: Hahto's Estate, 236 Wis. 65, 294 N.W. 500 (1941).
3. In re: Hofmann's Estate. 261 App. Div. 556, 26 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1941).
4 DEL. REv. CODE § 76-11 (1935).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-233 (1936).
6. FLA. STAT. § 394.11, 12 (1941).
7. IOWA CODE § 230.15 (1946).
8. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-2006 (1935).
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS (Ter. Ed. 1932). c. 123 § 96.
10. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 911 § 9-19 (1947).
11. MD. CODE 1939, 1943 Supp. Art. 59 § 4.
12. REv. Civ. CODE, Art. 28-143.
13. ALA. CODE, Tit. 45, § 213-214 (1940).
14. Com. GEN. STAT. § 2663 (1949).
15. IDAHO CODE § 66-354 (1947).
16. ARK. STAT. § 59-230-115 (1947) (father and mother, children and
grandchildren, but not husband or wife, are bound to pay); cf W. VA.
CODE § 27-5-2 (1943) (inmate, then husband or wife, then children
responsible).
17. Ky. REv. STAT. § 203.080 (1935).
18. BURNS' IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-401, 22-1201 (1933).
responsible person's estate.is sufficient to support the committed per-
son in addition to providing support for any other dependents, he
shall pay.
Ability to pay may be determined by a probate judge.19 The
maximum amount may be nominal.20
Other states, as Colorado, 21 Wisconsin,22 and Arizona, 23 con-
tinue to treat the support as a state responsibility.
There is some authority to support the constitutionality of all
such statutes.2 4 Specifically, it has been held that a statute imposing
liability on certain relatives without notice of hearing does not
amount to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.25 Nor is such a law class legislation, 26 for the distinction
between the able and the helpless is no more arbitrary than such
classifications as married women, infants, and indigents.
It has been contended that since the responsible party has al-
ready paid for the support of such institution through general taxes,
to compel him to pay directly for the support of an inmate would
amount to double taxation. But is would seem that since the state
has been partially reimbursed for the support, thus in effect re-
turning that money to the taxpayer in the form of a lightened
burden, that the contention is invalid. If the responsible party
must pay in the county hospital or poorhouse, if able, there is no
valid reason why he should not in a state hospital. 27 Further, such
payment is for services, and is not taxation, as such.
28
A statute imposing liability on certain relatives has been held
not to violate the constitutional requirement of uniformity.29 Nor
would such a law appear to impair the obligation of a contract, for,
since the inmate does not enter the hospital on a contractual basis,
the state may change the rules respecting him.30 Probability of
19. MIcE. COmp. LAws 330.28 § 18(a) (1948).
20. MNN. STAT. § 526.01 (1941).
21. '35 C.S.A. 105 § 42. But see § 16.
22. Ws. STA13. § 51.17 (1947) (any person may pay).
23. ARIZONA CODE § 8-303 (1939) (former provision for liability no
longer in code).
24. Re Yturburru, 134 Cal. 567, 66 P. 729 (1901); In re: Mansley's Estate,
253 Pa. 522, 98 A. 702 (1916).
25. State v. Bateman, 110 Kan. 546, 204 P. 682 (1922).
26. State Commission in Lunacy v. Eldridge, 7 Cal. A. 298, 94 P. 597 (1908).
27. Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 15 S.D. 494, 90 N.W. 147 (1902).
28. Guthrie County v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N.W. 454 (1907).
2 9. State v. Bateman, supra.
30. State v. Romme, 93 Conn. 571, 107 A. 519 (1919).
constitutionality is further emphasized by the fact that such laws in
some jurisdictions are over fifty years old.
II. Since § 125.1 states that "any person committed" falls
within its purview, the statutory provisions on commitment are per-
tinent. In substance, they are: A judge or trial justice may issue a
warrant on his own suspicion of insanity, feeble-mindedness, epi-
lepsy, or inebriety, or upon signed complaint of any respectable
citizen. The judge and two physicians shall then constitute a com-
mission to inquire whether such person is insane, epileptic, or
inebriate, in the course of which inquiry the judge shall summon
witnesses. The two physicians must satisfy themselves and the judge
of the mental condition of such person, whereupon, if the finding
is positive, the judge orders the sheriff to deliver him to the ap-
propriate hospital. Provision is made for appeal from the com-
mission's decision.
The persons legally liable for support are, in turn, set forth
in the code: The husband is liable for support of the wife; either
parent is liable for that of a son under sixteen or a daughter under
seventeen, or of a child of any age if incapacitated and in destitute
or necessitous circumstances. Children over sixteen must, after
reasonably providing for their immediate families, support or assist
their mother, or aged or infirm father.31
III. Certainly the determination of what is meant by "hard-
ship" should be reached by some reasonably ascertainable standard,
in order to prevent unfortunate inequities in the application of
§ 125.13. It is evident that ability to pay involves health, age, earn-
ing power, other dependents, and certain intangibles as well as
capital assets; yet the phrase "able to pay" is found in the majority
of the statutes imposing liability on the responsible person without
any elaboration of the meaning of "able." The meager case material
sheds little light on the matter; one leading case, cited frequently in
other cases and annotations, held that one of advanced years who
received sums totalling $12,000 over a period of fourteen years was
able to pay $10 per month for his wife during that period.3 2 Another
case, often quoted, held only that the husband was liable for his
wife's support during her incompetency, where circumstances did
not indicate it would be inequitable to compel him to pay.33 In
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-61 through 37-65.
32. Re Fox' Will, 275 N.Y. 604, 11 NE.2d 777 (1937).
33. Manufacturers Trust Co v. Gray, 278 N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938).
Pennsylvania the position has been taken that whereas "legally
able to pay" means "financially able to pay,"'34 there is no liability
to pay the exact sums expended for care, where liability is founded
on ability to pay.3 ' Certainly such sketchy equivocations are of little
assistance in formulating even the crudest sort of rule for defining
"hardship." The courts, however, possibly out of reluctance to
indulge in innovation, have been uniformly content to decide the
cases on the peculiar facts of each. The redeeming feature is that
any such liability being purely statutory, the statutory procedure
is exclusive and must be followed with exactness.3 6 In effect, this
appears in most cases to give the responsible party the benefit of
whatever doubt there may be as to his ability to pay.
IV. Material, both case and statutory, is notable for its omis-
sion of adequate treatment of certain elements of the problem. In
particular, there is little weight given to the types and degrees of
insanity and the consequent purposes motivating the commitment
of the various insane persons. Thus the scale may range from the
dangerous psychopathic, not yet a criminal, whom the state is
bound to commit and support as surely as it would any criminal, in
order to protect society, to the harmless case of senility whose basic
social fault is that he imposes a burden of added care on his immedi-
ate family, who therefore seek to conveniently place him out of
the way. The former case is no more the family's responsibility
than it would be if the individual were a convicted criminal, while
the latter case in no more society's responsiblity than if the indi-
vidual were infirm for any other cause, where, in either case, ability
to support is not an issue. Department of Welfare v Brock37 has
held that where a convict in the penitentiary was found insane and
transferred to the state hospital, the duty to support remains the
obligation of the state.
It would appear reasonable to impose no obligation upon the
responsible person which might ultimately result in pauperizing him
and thus creating a second public charge. This danger exists par-
ticularly in the case of aged or infirm persons possessing some capi-
tal. The rule adopted in California and other states requiring the
child to contribute to the impecunious parent's support on a sliding
34. 89 PA. L J. 285.
35. Comw. of Pa. v. Carr, 10 N.J. Super. 592, 77 A.2d 515 (1950).
36. Martin v. Beuter, 79 W. Va. 604, 91 S.E 452 (1917); In ze Hato's
Estate, supra.
37. 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915 (1947).
scale, based on the child's income, before the parent qualifies for
old age pension benefits, commends itself as a good beginning in es-
tablishing a workable formula. Hand in hand with the establish-
ment of a justly administered scale of contributions should go a
thorough screening of applicants to state mental hospitals, excluding
certain categories of individuals, such as the aged, the disabled,
and the indigent, for whom the state makes other provision.
It is concluded that the code provisions under consideration
implement the undoubted right of the state to recover whatever it
can of the sums necessarily expended for the support of those who
require institutional care. The right of the state exists when
the individual becomes a state charge on any basis other than that
of the convenience of the state; e.g., confinement for the protection
of society. It should be exercised, therefore, in the light of such
basic distinction.
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